Theme：Contracting over Persistent Information

Lecturer: Wei Zhao

Time：2022.06.09 14:00

Site：Tecent meeting 24-338-121

Abstract:

We consider a dynamic principal-agent problem, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses the principal’s preferred action. We show that there exists an optimal policy, where the principal recommends its most preferred action and discloses information as a reward in the next period, until either this action becomes statically optimal for the agent or the agent perfectly learns the state. If the agent perfectly learns the state with probability one under this policy, then learning occurs in finite time; the more patient the agent, the later he learns the state.

Introduction to the lecturer:

Wei Zhao, PhD candidate at HEC Paris, will join the School of Economics of Renmin University of China this year. Wei’ s main research fields are dynamic information design, network theory and financial economics. Two papers have been published in the revise and resubmit stages of high-level journals "Theoretical Economics" and "International Economic Review".