Theme：Local dominance

Lecturer: Jingyi Xue

Time：2022.06.02 14:00

Site：Tecent meeting 105-956-900

Abstract:

We define a local notion of dominance that speaks to the true choice problem between actions in a game tree. A strategy is weakly (obviously) dominant if and only if it prescribes a locally weakly (obviously) dominant action at every decision node, therefore any dynamic decomposition of a direct mechanism that preserves (obvious) strategy-proofness is robust to the lack of global planning. Further, we identify forms of rough contingent reasoning and blurred foresight that are driven by the game tree, and we construct a dynamic game that implements the Top Trading Cycles allocation under the corresponding notion of very local dominance.

Introduction to the lecturer:

Jingyi Xue is an associate professor at Singapore Management University, graduated from Rice University with a Ph.D. Her main research areas are fair distribution, decision theory and mechanism design. Her research results have been published in high-level journals such as Journal of Economic Theory and Economic Theory.