Abstract: We consider two variants of Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) housing market model in which agents’ rights to consume own endowments are restricted but their rights to exchange endowments are unrestricted. In each of the two models, we propose a core notion to characterize allocations that are immune to coalition blocking under such restricted rights. In each model we prove that the corresponding core can be found by a strategy-proof variant of the Top Trading Cycle mechanism. Our results generalize the classical result in the housing market model that the core can be found by the strategy-proof Top Trading Cycle mechanism.

该文在线发表于经济学综合性期刊Journal of Mathematical Economics。该期刊为best365网页版登录B+级奖励期刊。

论文链接：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102625