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韩立宁、Ruben Juarez*: Free intermediation in resource transmission
时间:2018-09-30    点击数:

  【Abstract】We provide a framework for the study of the allocation of a divisible resource from a planner to agents via intermediaries. Intermediaries simultaneously post fees for their services, and the planner optimally selects a subset of them to assist in the transmission of the resource. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a perfectly competitive equilibrium in which intermediaries selected by the planner collect no fees. Furthermore, these conditions are necessary and sufficient for the uniqueness of an equilibrium with the property that intermediaries not selected by the planner post zero prices. Furthermore, these conditions are necessary and sufficient to guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium when intermediaries who are not selected post fees equal to zero.

  【Keywords】Resource-sharing;Intermediation;Bertrand Competition

  该文刊登于Games and Economic Behavior,Volume 111, September 2018, Pages 75-84。该期刊为best365网页版登录A类奖励期刊。

  链接地址:https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982561830109X


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