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Dongkyu Chang,Jong Jae Lee(李锺在):Price skimming: Commitment and delay in bargaining with outside option
时间:2022-09-22    点击数:

    AbstractThis paper studies a bargaining problem in which the buyer's valuation and outside option are private information. We show that there exists a non-stationary equilibrium in which the seller can secure full commitment profit (from the optimal sales mechanism that exhibits price skimming) if and only if the buyer's outside option takes a zero value with positive probability (non-negligibly zero outside option). Our innovation is to show that (i) both the Coasean reversion and positive selection are necessary for the seller to secure the full commitment profit and (ii) the Coasean equilibria may coexist with positive selection despite their claimed incompatibility if the non-negligibly zero outside option exists. 

   KeywordsBargaining;Outside option;Commitment;Price skimming;Coase conjecture;Positive selection

 该文在202210月正式发表于Journal of Economic Theory该期刊为best365网页版登录A类期刊。

 论文链接:https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053122001181

 


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