Abstract:This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept “robust perfect equilibrium” for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed strategies and also in pure strategies) and satisfy the important properties of admissibility, aggregate robustness, and ex post robust perfection. These properties strengthen relevant equilibrium results in an extensive literature on strategic interactions among a large number of agents. Illustrative applications to congestion games are presented. In the particular case of a congestion game with strictly increasing cost functions, we show that there is a unique symmetric robust perfect equilibrium.

Keywords:Robust perfect equilibrium;Admissibility;Aggregate robustness;Ex post robust perfection;Large games;Congestion games

该文2022年2月在线发表于《Journal of Economic Theory》，该期刊为best365网页版登录学术期刊分级方案A奖励期刊