报告人：Di Zheng (CREED, University of Amsterdam)

时间：2017年11月30日，周四下午4:00-5:30

地点：B127

摘要: This paper studies the economic relevance of social distance, the perception of closeness between people, in a bribery situation. In the laboratory, we first exogenously manipulate social distance using minimum groups; then subjects of three conduct a real-effort task where a judge nominates a winner for a monetary prize from two performers who individually completes an objective task. In some treatments, the performers can bribe the judge. We vary treatments based on the social distance between the judge and the performers. The experimental evidence suggests that both bribes and in-group favouritism bias decision making. The results suggest that having the chance to bribe significantly decreases the weight of performance for the judge to determine a winner. The effect of a closer relationship, however, is asymmetric. We find no significant effects for bribe offers: Performers bribe regardless of the social distance, even if bribes are non-refundable. Judges, in contrast, exhibit strong in-group favouritism when there is no bribe and they value less the in-group membership when bribes are available. (joint with Gönül Dogan and Arthur Schram)

个人简介：Jin Di Zheng, a Ph.D. candidate from the University of Amsterdam. Her research of interests lie in Behavioural and Experimental Economics, more specifically, how social identity is influencing our daily economic behaviours. Her projects talk about how social status shapes social preference, how social distance distorts bribery behaviour, and peer wage comparison at workplace. She will join the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at Nanjing Audit University in China as an assistant professor in 2018.