题目：Money as Minimal Complexity

　　报告人：Pradeep Dubey，纽约州立大学石溪分校教授；耶鲁大学Cowles Foundation资深研究员

　　时间：2017年11月13日(周一) 14：30 ～ 16：00

　　地点：B253

　　报告摘要如下：

　　We consider mechanisms that provide the opportunity to exchange commodity i for commodity j, for certain ordered pairs ij: Given any connected graph G of opportunities, we show that there is a unique G-mechanism that satisfies some natural conditions of fairness and convenience. Next we define time and price complexity for any G-mechanism as (respectively) the time required to exchange i for j; and the information needed to determine the exchange ratio (each for the worst pair ij). If the number of commodities exceeds three, there are precisely three minimally complex G-mechanisms, where G corresponds to the star, cycle and complete graphs. The star mechanism has a distinguished commodity. the money, that serves as the sole medium of exchange and mediates trade between decentralized markets for the other commodities. Furthermore, for any weighted sum of complexities, the star mechanism is the unique minimizer of the sum for large enough m.

　　报告人简介：

　　Pradeep Dubey，1951年出生于印度，纽约州立大学石溪分校教授，耶鲁大学Cowles Foundation资深研究员，计量经济学会成员和博弈论学会理事会成员。从德里的圣·哥伦布学校毕业后，他在德里大学获得物理荣誉学士学位，在康奈尔大学获得应用数学博士学位。主要研究领域为博弈论与数理经济学，有多项研究成果发表于 “Econometrica”，“Games and Economic Behavior”，”Journal of Economic Theory ”和 “Quarterly Journal of Economics”等重要学术期刊。