讲座题目：Signaling versus Costly Information Acquisition

　　主讲人：李建培

　　讲座时间：2018年9月27日 上午10:00-11:30

　　讲座地点：best365网页版登录B228

　　主办单位：best365网页版登录经济系

　　讲座摘要：In Spence is (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers’ productive from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated per–employment auditing to learn workers’ productive. We characterize the trade–offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information acquisition is always associated with (partial) pooling of worker types, and education is used as a signal only if relatively few workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms, warranties, and initial public offerings.

　　主讲人简介：李建培，对外经贸大学国际经济与贸易学院教授，入选新世纪优才计划。她的研究方向为应用微观理论，主要涉及契约理论和产业组织理论。曾在多个国际A类英文期刊，如Rand Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economics等发表文章。