讲座主题：Resale Price Maintenance in a Corruptible Market

　　主讲人：吴嘉豪，香港中文大学经济系副教授

　　讲座时间：9月19日(周三)下午3:30-5:00

　　讲座地点：best365网页版登录B247

　　主办单位：best365网页版登录世界经济系，主持人：郭汝飞

　　摘要：We develop a model of resale price maintenance (RPM) in hospital procurement. Buying inputs on behalf of hospitals, the procurement managers can be “induced” by kickbacks to buy from a certain brand. A health inputs manufacturer sells its products to the hospitals through the distributors, each enjoys its own exclusive territories. Exclusive dealing is implicitly assumed as the distributors either carry the manufacturer’s products or some other brands but not both. In the absence of the distributor’s services, we show that the manufacturer would like to impose a minimum RPM to its distributors. The RPM makes it less likely for the hospital management to find out that other hospitals pays a lower price, reducing the procurement managers’ risk of getting caught receiving kickbacks. Without RPM, the distributors would under-price. Our theory offers an alternative explanation of the use of RPM by Johnson and Johnson (J&J) in Rainbow v. J&J, the first private anti-monopoly litigation in China

　　主讲人简介：Travis Ng is an associate professor of economics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He holds a PhD from the University of Toronto. He specializes in industrial organization. His recent interest is on the effects of trade on workplace safety. He has published in the Review of Economics and Statistics, Canadian Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Economic Psychology, Journal of Corporate Finance, and Journal of Economics and Management Strategy.