讲座题目：Dynamic Vaccination

主讲人：张巧汐 厦门大学 助理教授

地点：经管院A204

时间：2023年4月14日14:00

讲座内容摘要：

We study the schedule of mass vaccination as a social experimentation problem featuring both information and payoff externality. Vaccination protects both the vaccinated and the unvaccinated against infection, but may cause adverse side-effects in the vaccinated. The safety of vaccination can be learned through monitoring the vaccinated population over time. We derive the socially optimal dynamic vaccination scheme and demonstrate that the arrival rate of information critically affects the pattern of the optimal scheme. We also study the strategic experimentation game in which players independently choose when to get vaccinated. We characterize a Markov equilibrium featuring gradual vaccination and show that the society under-experiments at every belief. Lastly, we provide simple policies that drive the equilibrium toward the social optimum.

我们把大规模疫苗接种的时间表作为一个社会实验问题来研究，这个问题同时具有信息和支付外部性。接种疫苗可以保护接种疫苗的人和未接种疫苗的人免受感染，但在接种疫苗后可能会引起不良副作用。随着时间的推移，可以通过监测接种人群来了解接种疫苗的安全性。我们推导了社会最优的动态疫苗接种方案，证明了信息到达率对最优方案的模式有重要影响。我们还研究了战略实验博弈，在博弈中玩家可以自主选择何时接种疫苗。我们刻画了一个以逐渐接种为特征的马尔可夫均衡，并表明社会在每一个信念上都处于试验阶段。最后，我们提供简单的政策，推动均衡的社会最优。

主讲人简介：

张巧汐，2016在Caltech获得博士学位，后在Universidad de Chile进行博士后研究，并在Universidad Diego Portales任职。现在厦门大学担任助理教授职位。她的研究领域涉及learning, experimentation, information transmission, mechanism design等与博弈论相关话题，并在Games and Economic Behavior, Theoretical Economics发表文章。