讲座题目：Contracting over Persistent Information

主讲人：赵玮

时间：2022年6月9日（周四）14:00

地点：腾讯会议724-338-121

讲座主要内容：

We consider a dynamic principal-agent problem, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses the principal’s preferred action. We show that there exists an optimal policy, where the principal recommends its most preferred action and discloses information as a reward in the next period, until either this action becomes statically optimal for the agent or the agent perfectly learns the state. If the agent perfectly learns the state with probability one under this policy, then learning occurs in finite time; the more patient the agent, the later he learns the state.

主讲人简介：

赵玮，巴黎高等商学院在读博士，将于今年入职中国人民大学经济学院。主要研究领域为动态信息设计、网络理论和金融经济学，已有两篇论文处于高水平期刊《Theoretical Economics》和《International Economic Review》的revise and resubmit阶段。