讲座题目：Incentivizing Organ Donation Under Blood-Type Compatibility Constraints: Theory and Experiment

报告人：许梦涵

报告时间：2021年5月7日下午14:00

报告地点：经管院B247

主办单位：best365网页版登录数理经济与数理金融系

主持人：Daehyun Kim

内容摘要：This paper studies the efficacy of the donor-priority rule in promoting deceased organ donation under blood-type compatibility constraints in both theory and the laboratory. Compared with an allocation policy in which transplantations are operated only within the same blood-type group, we find that transferring organs across blood-type compatible groups discourages the donation incentives of hard-to-match agents, and reduces the supply of the more widely acceptable type of organs. Meanwhile, the easy-to-match agents have higher incentives to donate. At the aggregate level, our theoretical and experimental results both suggest that the aggregate donation rate is lower under allocation policies that allow blood-type compatible transplants among different blood-type groups.

主讲人简介：许梦涵，厦门大学经济学院与王亚南经济研究院助理教授。加州大学洛杉矶分校经济学博士。主要研究领域为微观经济理论、机制设计、产业组织理论等。主要研究成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory等国际学术期刊上。